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Introduction 
21 December 1988, Pan Am flight 103 went down above Lockerbie Scotland, killing 
259 people aboard the flight and 11 on the ground (BBC, 1988). The Lockerbie bombing was 
labeled as an act of terrorism. Libyan nationals were the prime suspects. Libya at that time 
was the target of unilateral economic sanctions by the US. After the Lockerbie bombing the 
United Nations imposed economic sanctions on Libya because they would not extradite the 
suspects (O‟Sullivan, 2003, 179). Neumann a deputy assistant for the Sectary of State for 
Near Eastern Affairs stated that US policy and their policy goals have remained consistent for 
three administrations. The US policy goals as formulated in this testimony are: to end the 
Libyan support for terrorism, to contain Gadhafi‟s regional ambitions and to prevent Libya 
from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. After the Lockerbie bombing the goals were 
added of bringing justice to the person‟s responsible, Libyan acknowledgment of the 
responsibility for the act and compensation to the families (Neumann, 2000; Hufbauer, Schott, 
Elliot & Oegg., 2009, 25).  
The US used sanctions against Libya because Libya supported international terrorism 
that resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Americans over the years and Libya and the US 
were directly opposite of each other on the Israel Palestine conflict and the existence of Israel 
(Anderson, 1999, 69). Both the US goals as well as the UN goal, the extradition of the 
suspects, were eventually achieved after economic sanctions had been used to coerce Libya. 
Libya is therefore a special case in which economic sanctions did work. The success of 
economic sanctions is dependent on several factors, leading to the main question: „In the case 
of Libya what factors contributed to the success of the economic sanctions?‟ 
 
Methodology 
This thesis is a case study of Libya examining what factors influenced the success of the 
economic sanctions. In the literature on economic sanctions fifteen factors have been 
identified that influence the outcome of economic sanctions. The literature about these factors 
will be used to explain the factors and how they influence the success of sanctions. Next, the 
factors are examined in relation to the Libyan case. The factors will be categorized in: 
contributing, semi-contributing and non-contributing for success.  
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Background on the US and UN sanctions 
United States sanctions against Libya 
The sanctions from the US started in 1978 with a ban on the sale of military equipment to 
Libya. The next year, Libya was put on the list of states sponsoring international terrorism. As 
a result there was a ban on most economic assistance, loans, support from international 
institutions and export of dual use items. In 1981 and 1982 president Reagan declared US 
passports invalid for travel to Libya, banned the import of crude oil and the export of 
equipment related to oil. In 1985 Reagan allowed the use of covert actions to undermine 
Gadhafi‟s regime, and banned the import of refined oil from Libya (Hufbauer et al., 2009, cd; 
O‟Sullivan, 2003, 178). 
 On the 27
th
 of December 1985 coordinated attacks on the airports of Rome and 
Vienna killed 19 people, wounding 110. These attacks supposedly had been made possible 
with Libyan support (Niblock, 2001, 30). Reagan invoked the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act in 1986. The result was a ban on almost all imports and exports and the 
US froze Libyan government assets in the US (Huliaras, 2001, 11; O‟Sullivan, 2003, 178). 
That same year was the bomb attack on a Berlin discotheque frequented by American service 
personal. In response, European ministers agreed to limit the number of Libyan diplomats in 
Europe. In retaliation the US bombed Gadhafi headquarters, military airfields, and terrorism 
training centers. Furthermore the US treasury forced US oil companies to leave Libya 
(Hufbauer et al., 2009, cd; O‟Sullivan, 2003, 178). 
On 21 December 1988 the Lockerbie bombing happened. Pan Am flight 103 exploded 
over Lockerbie killing 270 people. The US and UK blamed the bomb attack on Libya. A year 
later French airliner UTA flight 772 exploded over Niger killing 171. The French, US and UK 
demanded the arrest of the suspects. In 1996 the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act was implemented, which prohibits financial commerce with Libya and US aid for states 
that support Libya (Hufbauer et al., 2009, cd; O‟Sullivan, 2003, 179). This same year the Iran-
Libya sanctions act was invoked. This act penalized companies that invested more than 40 
million dollar into Libya‟s energy sector (Niblock, 2001, 32). Because of this act the President 
had to choose from two out of six possible sanctions, ranging from import restrictions to 
denial of credits from an US bank (Hufbauer et al., 2009, cd; O‟Sullivan, 2003, 179). 
In 1999 Libya turned over the two suspects of the Lockerbie attack to The 
Netherlands. The UN sanctions ended, the US warned that the verdict alone is not enough to 
lift sanctions. Libya also needed to acknowledge responsibility and to compensate the 
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families. In 2001 congress renewed the Iran-Libya sanction act for another 5 years despite 
opposition of domestic firms (Hufbauer et al., 2009, cd; O‟Sullivan, 2003, 179). 
In 2003 the families of the Lockerbie bomb attack received 2.7 billion dollars in 
compensation. That same year Libya agreed to stop its weapon of mass destruction program. 
As a result Bush lifted the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act in 2004. Shortly thereafter because the 
goals were reached he also declared the end to the national emergency with regard to Libya, 
and lifted related sanctions (Hufbauer et al., 2009, cd).  
 
United Nations sanctions against Libya 
Libyan nationals had been indicted for the Lockerbie attack by an US court in 1991. The UN 
passed resolution 748 in 1992, which called on Libya to turn over the suspects of the 
Lockerbie and UTA flight 772 bomb attacks (Huliaras, 2001, 11-12). Resolution 748 had the 
following consequences: a flight ban, a ban on the sale of military equipment and restricted 
the movement of Libyan diplomats (UNSC, 1992). The UN implemented sanctions with 
extradition as a goal. On April 15th 1992 the UN sanctions went into effect. In 1993 the UN 
passed resolution 883, which strengthened existing sanctions. Resolution 883 froze Libyan 
funds and financial resources abroad, banned export of selected equipment for the energy 
sector and tightened air restrictions (Hurd, 2005, 504; O‟Sullivan, 2003, 179).  
On the 24
th
 of August 1988 the plan was revealed for the trial to take place in The 
Netherlands under Scottish law. On the 27th of August the United Nations Security Council 
voted to suspend sanctions if Libya extradited Lockerbie suspects and cooperated with France 
on UTA flight 772 bombing. In 1999 France convicted six suspects over the UTA flight 772 
bombing in absence. In 2003 Libya accepted responsibility for the Lockerbie bomb attack in a 
letter to the United Nations Security Council. On the 12th of September 2003 the UN 
sanctions were formally lifted (Hufbauer et al., 2009, cd). 
 
Theoretical framework of economic sanctions 
The reason states use economic sanctions seems simple. The sender state imposes costs 
through the use of economic sanctions. If the costs on the target state become too high they 
will concede to the demands of the sender state. The sender state can coerce the target state 
without the use of military force. If the costs of economic sanctions becomes higher the 
chance of success increases (Drury, 1998, 508). 
Hufbauer et al. argue that economic sanctions are effective but the effectiveness of 
economic sanctions depends on foreign policy goals (Hufbauer et al., 2009, 158). The 
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effectiveness of economic sanctions is heavily discussed however (Hufbauer et al, 2009; 
Pape, 1997; Elliot, 1998; Drury, 1998). Hufbauer et al. argue that sanctions are effective in 
34% of the cases; Pape argues that sanctions are effective in 5% of the cases. Nevertheless 
most authors have defined factors that influence the effectiveness and outcome of economic 
sanctions. Some argue that the success of economic sanctions is conditional on the institutions 
in the target state (Lektzian & Souva, 2007, 849). Another example of discussion about 
economic sanctions is: whether unilateral, multilateral of institutional economic sanctions are 
more effective. From the examples it is clear that the literature is not unanimous about which 
factors influence the outcome of economic sanctions. Therefore it is important to analyze 
which factors contributed to success in Libya.   
 
Analysis of the factors that contributed to the success of economic sanctions 
Economic health and political stability of target country 
The effectiveness of economic sanctions depends on the economic and political health of the 
target country. It should be noted that while weaker states are more vulnerable to economic 
sanctions the relation between economic health, political stability and sanction success is 
relatively weak (Hufbauer et al., 2009, 100; Drury, 1998, 507-508). When the goal is 
destabilization, an unstable country is easier to destabilize (Dashti-Gibson, Davis & Radcliff, 
1998, 508).  
In Libya during 1973 and 1974 Gadhafi‟s regime gained more control of the state 
through the nationalization of oil production, and Libya became a major player in the OPEC. 
However the increase in oil revenue was a point of dispute in the ruling party of Libya. In 
1975 the ruling party split and a major coup was led by two members of the ruling party. The 
coup was a crucial event (Anderson, 1999, 73).  
 Anderson stated: “In the almost quarter century since August 1975, Qadhafi has 
resided over a series of increasingly bizarre attempts to create a political structure that would 
somehow generate a society in Libya that would share his vision and to form political 
institutions through which he could mobilize the society to carry it out. None of these 
attempts succeeded” (Anderson, 1999, 74). 
 In 1987 Gadhafi started undoing his „revolution‟ and started a slow and small process 
of liberalization (Anderson, 1999, 76).During the sanction episodes against Libya the effect of 
sanctions was amplified by economic mismanagement, corruption, a booming population and 
mismanagement was hurting the public sector (O‟Sullivan, 2003, 213). The impact on the 
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public sector and the civilian civilization was also amplified by Libya‟s decision to maintain 
its oil industry and continue the construction of the Man-Made River. Economic-policy 
making in Libya was impromptu; decisions were taken for acute problems without thinking 
about the long term (Niblock, 2001, 68-70).   
 Libya during the sanctions could still sell its oil. The sanctions however increased 
transportation costs and increased the inflation rate by 20 to 60 percent a year. Libya‟s 
economy had barely grown during the sanctions (Huliaras, 2001, 18).  Because of the reasons 
mentioned above, Libya was motivated to accept a compromise over the trial of the suspects 
of the Lockerbie bomb attack. The Libyan government wanted to bolster the already failing 
economy, which requires that the sanctions against Libya needed to be lifted. The failing 
economy increased Libya‟s eagerness to normalize relations and see the suspension of 
sanctions (Huliaras, 2001, 19; Hurd, 2005, 505).  The economic mismanagement and 
Gadhafi‟s revolution almost let to an explosion of discontent under the civilian population. 
Gadhafi sensing the discontent started softening his policies (John, 2008, 79). 
The drop in oil revenue was not a result of Libyan problems but rather a reflection of 
the global developments. In the early 1990s the price of oil fell, this drop in revenue lasted till 
1997 (Niblock, 2001, 65). Libya in 2000 would have been capable of producing 2 million 
barrels a day. However, Libya did not reach the 2 million partly from the UN and US 
sanctions but mostly because of the international and domestic situation. So while the 
sanctions did not significantly increase the costs for Libya‟s economy, they were an 
impediment to further growth of the Libyan economy, and therefore its overall stability 
(O‟Sullivan, 2003, 201-202). 
While not an internal factor, the invasion of Iraq following 9/11 was an important 
event for the stability of Libya. The attack on 9/11 was a pretext to deal with countries of 
concern for the US. There were some who lobbied for an invasion in Libya like was done in 
Afghanistan. Libya realizing this kept a low profile, agreed with US policies even on Israel-
Palestine and did everything possible to agree on compensation of the Lockerbie bombing 
families (Zoubir, 2006, 58; O‟Sullivan, 2003, 185-186). 
The „economic health and political stability of target country‟ contributed to the 
success of the economic sanctions against Libya. The weak political stability of Libya is 
illustrated by the dispute over oil revenue before there were sanctions and Gadhafi‟s 
revolution. The weak economic health is illustrated by the economic mismanagement that 
happened in Libya during the sanctions.  These factors combined resulted in an unstable 
Libya which was eager to see the sanctions end to rebuild the economy. Next to the economic 
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considerations the invasion of Iraq made Libya concede on the payments to the Lockerbie 
families.  
 
Regime target state & smart sanctions 
Autocratic states are harder to influence through economic sanctions than democratic states. 
However, the degree of difficulty sender states experience depends on the goal of the 
economic sanctions (Hufbauer et al., 2009, 166-167; Lektzian & Souva, 2007, 867). When the 
goal is regime change the target in an autocratic state should be the population. When the 
opposition becomes organized, it is capable of regime change (Major, 2012, 84). When the 
goal of the economic sanctions against an autocratic state is regime change or 
democratization, and the exile options for the target regime are of low quality, they will 
endure the sanctions. The elite in an autocratic state prevents a revolution by increasing the 
costs to revolt and by decreasing the public goods (Oechslin, 2014, 38).  
However, some argue that autocratic states are more resistant to economic sanctions 
because the population cannot realize change. Economic sanctions against autocratic states 
should focus on the winning coalition, which are most often the elite in autocratic states. 
Targeted sanctions help focus the hardship of economic sanctions on the leaders of autocratic 
regimes, which increases domestic pressure. These targeted sanctions consist of: freezing of 
personal bank accounts and travel bans (Allen, 2008, 939; Brooks, 2002, 49; Lektzian 
&Souva, 2007, 867).  
Smart sanctions are targeted sanctions. Instead of targeting the whole population like 
comprehensive sanctions does, smart sanctions are used to target the government or 
individuals with power (Hufbauer et al., 2009, 138). While in theory smart sanctions would 
seem to be a great tool its implementation is extremely difficult, because they need to be 
precise and effective. The difficulties arise because of the lack of administrative capacity, 
legal loopholes, institutional weakness, political constraint and technical problems. Smart 
sanctions are a tool used to send a signal rather than achieving goals (Tostesen & Bull, 2002, 
402; Hufbauer et al., 2009, 139-141; Hovi, Huseby & Sprinz, 2005, 499). 
Under Gadhafi Libya was an autocratic state (Hufbauer et al., 2009, cd). But even 
though Libya was an autocratic state the economic sanctions were a success. Libya has used 
the sanctions to strengthen the regime, make the population more dependent on the regime 
and to strengthen popular support (Niblock, 2001, 218). Gadhafi manipulated the domestic 
view of the UN sanctions to gather popular support. However, as a result Gadhafi could only 
use sanctions as a scapegoat during the UN sanctions. When the UN sanctions were lifted he 
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could not blame the economic situation on the US sanctions (Huliaras, 2001, 19).  Because 
autocratic states are thought to be more resilient to sanctions smart sanctions were 
instrumental for the success in Libya.  
 US ambassador Richardson in 1998 argued that the economic hardship of the civilian 
population was not the result of UN sanctions because UN sanctions were targeted sanctions 
meant to prevent costs for the civilian population (Hufbauer et al., 2009, cd).The UN 
sanctions were smart sanctions that made member states more compliant with the sanctions 
because they did not incur a lot of humanitarian suffering (O‟Sullivan, 2003, 220). Resolution 
883 for example called for: the freezing of assets, reconfirms the limits on Libyan diplomatic 
staff, a ban on the equipment used in the energy sector and a flight ban (UNSC, 1993).  
Some US sanctions can also be defined as smart sanctions. The Iran-Libya Sanctions 
Act targets companies that invested more than $40 million was a smart sanction. Another 
example of smart sanctions is the ban on air travel which was supposed to target the elite 
(Niblock, 2001, 77-79).  
The factor „regime target state & smart sanctions‟ contributed to the success of 
economic sanctions in Libya. The smart sanctions like the ban on oil equipment, the flight ban 
and the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act ensured that the already damaged economy could not grow 
or recover.  
 
Type of sanction  
Sanctions can be categorized in three categories: export, import and financial sanctions 
(Hufbauer et al., 2009, 63). These sanctions can be used alone but are often used in 
conjunction with each other. Sanctions featuring both trade and financial sanctions have been 
found to have the most impact (Hufbauer et al., 2009, 98).  
Financial sanctions, which fall in the category smart sanctions, are especially 
important. While import/export sanctions can damage the whole economy they often hurt the 
civilians more than the elite. Financial sanctions can be more effective because they can target 
the elite more easily, like for example the denial of access to foreign currency (Dashti-Gibson 
et al., 1997, 610). For every goal not being destabilization, the use of financial sanctions is 
crucial. The damage done by wide trade sanctions only is not effective (Dashti-Gibson et al., 
1997, 615).  
In Libya all the categories of sanctions were implemented. An example of export 
sanctions was the ban on the export of equipment related to the oil sector under resolution 883 
(UNSC, 1993). An example of import sanctions was the ban on Libyan import of oil in 1985 
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(O‟Sullivan, 2003, 178). Financial sanctions such as the freezing of assets were implemented 
through UN resolution 883, and the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (Treasury, 1996). Resolution 
883 tightened the sanctions already in place under resolution 748 (UNSC, 1993). The UN ban 
on the sale of oil equipment and technology and a ban on financial transactions were 
especially damaging for the Libyan economy (Takeyh, 2001, 64). 
The Libyan society used to be one of the most egalitarian societies in the Middle East. 
After sanctions were imposed, persons with international contacts developed a parallel 
economy not under state control. Because of their semi-monopoly position, the merchants 
with international contacts could increase the prices, which led to inequality and instability 
(Niblock, 2001, 77-78). Therefore while it helped that all types of sanctions were 
implemented against Libya, the smart sanctions were the most pivotal in ensuring the success 
of the economic sanctions against Libya. The smart sanctions restricted the reconstruction of 
the Libyan economy. 
 
Extent of cooperation with the sender state (unilateral/ multilateral/institutional) 
One of the main points of debate on the effectiveness of economic sanctions is whether 
unilateral or multilateral sanctions are more effective. Although it can be expected that an 
increase in international cooperation will result in an increase of the costs and or success this 
is not necessarily true (Drury, 1998, 502; Pape, 1997, 107-108). International cooperation is 
not a guarantee to success. When international cooperation is used, it is often in cases where 
the goals set are viewed as important. These cases are less likely to succeed because of their 
high stake nature and enforcement problems (Hufbauer & Schott, 1985, 731; Drezner, 2000, 
75). However, the relationship between international cooperation and the effectiveness of 
sanctions is positive when there is an international institution involved. An international 
institution for instance can deal with enforcement problems (Drury, 1998, 505; Drezner, 2000, 
75). 
In some exceptions scholars argue that multilateral sanctions are more effective than 
unilateral sanctions (Bapat & Morgan, 2009; Morgan, Bapat & Krustev, 2009). A key way for 
multilateral sanctions to succeed is by focusing on a single issue or by involving an institution 
(Bapat & Morgan, 2009, 1092). Sanctions will be more successful the larger the sender group 
gets, and the clearer violated norms are communicated. However, there might be a loss of 
credibility when multilateral sanctions are employed without an institution (Doxey, 1980, 
488).  
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The general consensus finds multilateral sanctions to be less effective than unilateral 
sanctions. They are thought to be more effective however when an institution is involved. The 
institution prevents backsliding, is a legitimate platform, deals with problems of cooperation, 
is the target of blame from the domestic audience of the sender country (instead of the 
government of sender country), reduces transaction costs and creates incentives to cooperate 
(Drury, 1998, 507; Drezner, 2000, 86; Hafner-Burton & Montgomery, 2008, 216; Escriba-
Folch, 2010, 140). When an institution grows larger it becomes increasingly more difficult to 
prevent sanction busting by its members. However, the size of the UN does not decrease the 
ability to combat sanction busting (Early & Spice, 2015, 358). 
In the Libyan case the US sanctions ended successfully after achieving its goals over a 
26 year period (Hufbauer et al., 2009, 25). Collins researched why Libya stopped supporting 
terrorism. He argues that the unilateral sanctions were not effective, because during the 1980s 
Libya could sell its oil to other countries. Furthermore, Libya received weapons from the 
Soviet Union and exchanged goods with a variety of countries. The Lockerbie and UTA flight 
772 bombing showed Libya‟s determination to continue their support for terrorism, defying 
unilateral sanctions from the US (Collins, 2004, 10-11; Weisburg, 1987, 997). Furthermore, in 
1983 Libya invaded Chad. The US sanctions did not contain Libya‟s regional ambition 
(Hufbauer et al., 2009, cd). The sanctions even provoked international outrage (O‟Sullivan, 
2003, 205). The unilateral sanctions by the US in the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act tried to 
sanction firms not based in the US. The EU would not allow its citizens and companies to be 
sanctioned by the US (O‟Sullivan, 2003, 183). The UN sanctions however were effective at 
ending Libyan support for international terrorism (Collins, 2004, 16).  
The UN sanctions were partly responsible for the drop of oil revenue in Libya. The 
revenue dropped from $22 billion in 1980 to $6 billion in 1998. The UN sanctions were 
effective because of their wide reach and compliance by UN member states (Collins, 2004, 
12). The concessions Libya was willing to make to end the UN sanctions show the 
effectiveness of these institutional sanctions. Two months after the implementation of 
sanctions Libya offered to extradite the suspects to third party countries. Furthermore, since 
1993 Libya was not involved in any terrorist actions and tried to erase the connection between 
them and terrorist organizations (Collins, 2004, 14).  
The UN sanctions played a crucial role in limiting Libya. The UN sanctions helped 
limit Libya mostly on the political and military spectrum, while it was harder to limit Libya 
on the economical spectrum. The UN sanctions worked, because they magnified the already 
existing situation in Libya. The bombing of Libya immediately after the Berlin bomb attack, 
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made the world view the US unilateral sanctions as a pretext for invasion. As a result of the 
involvement of the UN, the goals of the US were brought more in line with the international 
community. Because the UN sanctions were more targeted, more countries were willing to 
agree, the countries incurred less costs and the threshold of compliance was higher 
(O‟Sullivan, 2003, 218-220).  
Only after the UN sanctions stopped, the sanctions by the US achieved their goals. 
Before the UN sanctions, the US sanctions were not effective. After the UN sanctions were 
lifted the US sanctions Libya could not fully revitalize its energy sector. Only the US could 
export the right equipment needed for the energy sector. The damage done by UN sanctions 
could not be lifted without US equipment, and the US did not allow the export of oil related 
equipment until after Libya agreed to its goals (Jentleson & Whytock, 2006, 80).  
 
Analysis of the factors that semi-contributed to the success of economic sanctions 
Costs imposed on target state (GNP) 
When a state wants to implement economic sanctions successfully against a target state it 
should do so with the highest available costs to the target country. To measure the costs of 
economic sanctions, the percentage of the GNP in costs can be used (Hufbauer et al., 2009, 
105). In successful cases the average cost was 2% of the targets GNP (Hufbauer & Schott, 
1985, 730). Even though Morgan & Schwebach argued that sanctions are not very effective, 
imposing extreme costs on the target country can have a moderately positive effect on the 
outcome of sanctions (Morgan & Schwebach, 1997, 46). It should be noted that costs alone, 
while important, do not determine the effectiveness of sanctions.  
The annual costs for Libya as a result of the economic sanctions of the US was 1.7 
percent of its GNP (Hufbauer et al., 2009, cd). This percentage of 1.7 is lower than what 
Hufbauer and Schott (1985) found as their average in successful cases (Hufbauer & Schott, 
1985, 730). The costs of the UN sanctions against Libya was 0.9 percent of its GNP annually 
(Hufbauer et al., 2009, cd). Libya itself calculated the damage due to the economic sanctions 
at $33 billion. The World Bank calculated that the Libyan economy „only‟ lost $18 billion 
(Takeyh, 2001, 64). For reference Libya‟s Man-Made River, which was a huge aqueduct, was 
supposed to cost $30 billion, making it clear that the man-made river was a contributor to the 
critical situation of Libya‟s economy (Huliaras, 2001, 19). 
Clearly Libya‟s economy suffered during the period of sanctions. The damage done to 
the Libyan economy cannot be fully contributed to the sanctions. Libya suffered more from 
Gadhafi‟s internal policies and disputes in the OPEC, while relying for 95% on oil for its 
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foreign exchange. Therefore the effect of economic sanctions on the resulting damage on the 
economy was a lot smaller (O‟Sullivan, 2003, 187-188).  
The „costs imposed on target state (GNP)‟ was only a semi contributor to the success 
of economic sanctions in Libya. While the cost to the Libyan economy was necessary for 
success of the sanctions, the cost cannot be fully contributed to the sanctions.  
 
International assistance to the target country (black knights) 
Black knights are allies of the target country, which through their support can reduce the 
impact of economic sanctions (Hufbauer et al, 2009, 8). Sanction busting by states happens 
because of political, economic and strategic considerations (Early, 2011, 382; Moore, 2010, 
607). However, sanction busting can also be driven by a calculated response by profit driven 
firms (Early, 2009, 67). Black knights have a negative impact on economic sanctions. Black 
knights can soften the economic costs, boost government spending and increase the duration 
of sanctions (Hufbauer et al., 2009, 172-175). However, the degree of negative impact 
depends on the timing and quantity (Early, 2011, 382; Lektzian & Souva, 2007, 866).  
It can be argued that Libya did not receive significant support for ideological or 
economic reasons from a Black Knight (Hufbauer et al., 2009, cd; Collins, 2004, 11). 
However, for the first few years of the sanctions until 1991, Libya was receiving some 
support by the Soviet Union. Libya never fully embraced the Soviet Union. After the Soviet 
Union fell, Libya lost its most important sponsor and support. Libya‟s anti-imperialism 
rhetoric became irrelevant and the non-alignment movement moved towards globalization 
(O‟Sullivan, 2003, 210). Even though UN sanctions were in place most European Union 
countries kept importing Libyan oil. Italy imported 42% of the Libyan oil production in 1994, 
Germany nineteen percent and Spain eleven percent. States were not the only ones who 
helped Libya. The Italian state-owned company Agip stated that it wanted to invest $8-$10 
billion before the end of the century in 1994 (Pound & El-Tahri, 1994). Furthermore an 
Egyptian company got caught exporting several millions of dollars of embargoed aircraft 
parts. Libya had an extensive network of banking connections worldwide. One of these was 
the ABC bank of which the owners were Libya, Kuwait and Abu Dhabi. ABC had worldwide 
assets of $18 billion and made a profit of more than $300 million in 1993. The chairman 
Saudi denied that ABC was a front for the Libyan government arguing that he received 
directions from a 12 member board of which only 3 were Libyan (Pound & El-Tahri, 1994).  
The relative absence of „international assistance to the target country (black knights)‟ 
semi contributed to the success of economic sanctions. There was some form of support from 
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the Soviet Union before the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, some violations of 
the economic sanctions occurred but these violations did not prevent the successful outcome 
of the economic sanctions against.  
 
Domestic audience sender country 
States can be forced to action by their own civilian population. This may also hold true for 
economic sanctions. The sender state might be forced to „do something‟, but does not want to 
over commit, so it uses sanctions. Sanctions can be used as a symbolic signal that the 
behavior by the target state is not tolerated. It can be argued that pleasing the domestic 
audience is a favorable outcome even when the targeted state does not change its behavior 
(Hufbauer & Schott, 1985, 729).  
One of the reasons why the US prolonged its sanctions after the UN sanctions stopped 
was because of the strong lobby groups from the Lockerbie bombing families. The sanctions 
were a tool to address Libyan involvement in the Lockerbie bombing; it showed the American 
civilian population that the government was „doing something‟. Furthermore the sanctions 
allowed the American government to signal that they did not tolerate terrorism and the 
support for international terrorism. Libya did not have an influential lobby group in the US 
that lobbied for its interests. The sanctions could be used to signal intentions with low costs, 
because no actor represented Libya (O‟Sullivan, 2003, 216). 
 The factor „domestic audience sender country‟ was a semi contributor to the success of 
the sanctions against Libya. The domestic audience of the US increased the length and 
pressed the US more to see the sanctions end successfully. The pressure of the domestic 
audience of the US only mattered after the UN sanctions were lifted, therefore this factor was 
a semi-contributor.  
 
Issue salience 
Issue salience can be defined as how important a certain issue is for the state (Ang & Peksen, 
2007, 135). When there is an asymmetric distribution of issue salience it affects the failure or 
success of economic sanctions. An asymmetric distribution happens if different values are 
attached to the same issue by different states (Ang & Peksen, 2007, 135). If the sender state 
find the issue more important than the target state this has significant influence on a positive 
outcome. The perception of the salience of issues determines the level of determination states 
use to produce positive outcomes for economic sanctions (Ang & Peksen, 2007, 143).  
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In the Libyan case there was an asymmetric distribution of issue salience. The US the 
sender state did not cease sanctions after UN sanctions were lifted, because their goals had not 
been reached. This illustrates that the asymmetric distribution favors the US, and the issue 
salience was higher for the US than that of Libya. In the Libyan case the issue salience was 
asymmetrically distributed favoring the US. As predicted when the asymmetric distribution 
favors the sender state the sanctions were a success. Therefore the factor „issue salience‟ only 
semi contributed to the success of the sanctions. It did contribute but was not as important as 
the factors in the category that „contributed‟.  
 
Analysis of the factors that did not contribute to the success of economic sanctions 
The non-contributing factors can be split into factors that did not apply in Libya, factors that 
were present but with a contrary outcome to what was expected by the literature, factors 
which are used by the mentioned in the literature but found to be irrelevant and factors which 
the literature is ambiguous about what is needed for success.  
 
Warmth of prior relations between target and sender state 
The warmth of prior relations between target and sender state matters for the effectiveness of 
economic sanctions. When the relations are warmer the target state will make concessions 
faster and the target population is more receptive to external pressure. Target countries with 
friendly relations will reconsider the relation before conceding or defying economic sanctions. 
The relation between the warmth of prior relations and the effectiveness is positive because it 
gives more leverage (Hufbauer et al., 2009, 67; Hufbauer & Schott, 1985, 730; Allen, 2005, 
132). However, the opposite is also true when the prior relation is split into alignment and 
realignment. Realignment shows the balancing behavior of the target state. Because of the 
balancing behavior the target state is motivated to reduce the concession it will make. 
Therefore realignment can have a negative impact on the outcome of economic sanctions 
(Drezner, 2000, 91-92). Even though the relation can be positive or negative, the prior relation 
is not significant according to Drury (Drury, 1998, 507).  
After Gadhafi took power the US had little reason to worry that Gadhafi would take 
interest in communism. The US was more interested in Libyan oil. The optimism during this 
period quickly shifted to antagonistic relations (Zoubir, 2006, 48-49). Zoubir argues the 
antagonistic relation did not start over Libya‟s support for terrorism but the Libyan decision to 
nationalize parts of its oil sector in 1970. The antagonistic relations remained for the duration 
of the sanctions until 2004 (Zoubir, 2006, 49).  
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Prior to the economic sanctions by the UN, first suspicions arose in 1990 of Libyan 
involvement in the Lockerbie bombing, by British and US investigators. On the 27
th
 of 
November 1990 France, UK and the US demanded that Libya hands over the two suspects, 
and demanded Libyan cooperation over the UTA flight 772 bombing. The Libyan government 
rejected this (Niblock, 2001, 35-37). The three countries in the UN that argued for the 
sanctions prior to 1992 were France, UK and the US, which were important countries on the 
United Nations Security Council. Gadhafi stated that because of the lack of trust between 
Libya and the US, the case could not be tried in either the US or UK. No objections were 
raised to extraditing suspects to France (Niblock, 2001, 39).  
The already antagonistic relations from unilateral US sanctions ensured that simple 
negotiations were doomed to fail and the UN eventually had to use economic sanctions. 
Because the relation between Libya and the US was antagonistic at the start of the sanctions 
the prior warmth did not contribute to the success of the sanctions. The US did not have more 
leverage over Libya because the relation was not „warm‟. Furthermore, the US and arguably 
the UK were the force in the UN on the sanctions that targeted Libya. As indicated by the lack 
of trust these prior relations to were antagonistic. Therefore this factor did not apply in Libya.   
 
Commercial relations between target and sender state 
The commercial relation between sender and target can have an impact on the outcome of 
sanctions. If there is a high commercial relation between the sender and target state the costs 
tied to the economic sanctions will increase. The commercial relations between sender and 
target can be measured by using the flow of two-way merchandise trade (Hufbauer et al., 
2009, 55-62). 
However, when using a multivariate analysis the amount of pre-sanction trade does 
not influence the outcome of economic sanctions. While pre-sanction trade gives the sender 
country more leverage, the loss of trade relative to the pre sanctions level of trade, does not 
necessarily damage the target. The loss of GNP that results from the diminishing of trade is 
what influences the effectiveness of economic sanctions (Drury, 1998, 507). 
During the 1970s the import of goods from Libya by the US grew from $215.8 million 
in 1973 to $7.8 billion in 1980. In 1980 Libya was responsible for 10% of the imported oil of 
the US. US exports grew from $103.7 million to $426.2 million (Niblock, 2001, 27-28). 
Libyan exports in 1980 were for 35% destined for the US. In 1987 0% of export went to the 
US (O‟Sullivan, 2003, 190). When the US sanctions were implemented Libya simply 
diversified its market. Libyan oil became popular in Europe. In response to their own 
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sanctions the US replaced Libyan oil with North Sea oil. The costs for Libya on other export 
products were only $180 million from 1986 till 2001. At the same time Libya was capable of 
replacing imports formerly from the US with imports from the EU and Asia when the US 
implemented a full export ban. The impact of trade GNP was small because both the US and 
Libya diversified (O‟Sullivan, 2003, 189-191). Because of the small impact of trade GNP „the 
commercial relations between target and sender state‟ did not apply in Libya and therefore did 
not contribute to the success of sanctions. 
 
Costs imposed on sender state 
While economic sanctions are meant to hurt the target state they often come with costs for the 
sender state. The costs of sanctions for domestic firms have a negative effect on the outcome 
of sanctions (Hufbauer & Schott, 1985, 731; Drury, 1998, 504). When financial sanctions are 
used, the costs to sender are inconsequential (Hufbauer et al., 2009, 98). 
Economic sanctions increase the costs of doing business abroad and increase long term 
uncertainty. Not only the target country but all the business partners of the sender country 
might find it more profitable, both economically and politically, to diversify their markets 
after a sanctions episode has been initiated (Hufbauer et al., 2009, 108). Unless the sender 
state can find a way to send effective low costing economic sanctions the sender state will 
receive significant costs for the economic sanctions.  
However, when economic sanctions are used with low cost for the sender state it sends 
a signal of weakness that results in an increased chance of militarized conflict instead of 
sanctions success (Lektzian & Sprecher, 2007, 415). The costs of economic sanctions are not 
only present in the economic realm. When the sender state fails to achieve the goals set, it can 
incur political costs (Hufbauer et al., 2009, 112). 
The political and economic costs on the UN and US were small and limited and the 
benefits outweighed the costs. Out of the UN nations the US suffered the most from its own 
sanctions and the UN sanctions. Indirectly the US damaged its own interests by putting a ban 
on imports on oil from Libya. The US wanted to diversify and did not want to be reliant on a 
small number of suppliers. By banning Libyan oil the pool of possible oil supplies became 
smaller. Furthermore, there were costs to US domestic oil firms who could not invest in Libya 
while their international competitors could. The overall cost to the US economy was however 
small because the US replaced Libyan imports with imports from other countries (O‟Sullivan, 
2003, 213-215).  The factor „costs imposed on sender state‟ was not a contributor to the 
success of the sanctions. The overall cost to the US was small and therefore did not motivate 
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the US to cease sanctions because the costs on the US economy were too high. This factor did 
not apply to the Libyan case. 
 
Implementation design (built up versus maximum) 
Economic sanctions can be implemented with maximum costs directly or costs can be 
gradually increased. Imposing maximum costs decreases the chance that the economic 
sanctions escalate into military conflict. Furthermore, sanctions need to be implemented with 
maximum costs because an incremental increase allows the target state to plan evasion of the 
economic sanctions. The target state is then allowed to gather domestic support, search for 
new markets and built new alliances (Hufbauer et al., 2009, 168; Hufbauer & Schott, 1985, 
731).  
In Libya the US and UN sanctions have been built up instead of immediately 
implemented maximally. The sanctions against Libya became more enveloping the longer 
Libya resisted the sanctions. From the list of sanctions in the background section it can be 
determined that neither the UN nor the US implemented maximum costs when they first 
sanctioned Libya. The „implementation design‟ did not contribute to the success of economic 
sanctions. Because the maximum costs implementation design was not used.  
 
Companion policies 
Economic sanctions, while often used as a substitute for military intervention, can be used as 
complements rather than substitutes (Hufbauer & Schott, 1985, 727). Economic sanctions are 
best not used without companion policies (Pape, 1997, 110; Elliot, 1998, 58). Sanctions have 
been used as a precursor to military conflict. Covert actions were used to complement regime 
change in the target country government (Hufbauer et al., 2009, 56-57). If the goal of the 
economic sanction is of great importance to the sender, a threat needs to be made about the 
possibility of the use of force to the target country (Elliot, 1998, 58). There are three types of 
companion policies: covert actions, quasi-military action, and regular military action.  
The use of companion policies in the success case of Libya is evident. However, they 
were not very effective. During the sanctions there was a conflict between Libyan and US jets 
above the Gulf of Sidra. Furthermore, in 1985 Reagan allowed the use of covert actions to 
destabilize Gadhafi his regime and to remove Gadhafi from power (Niblock, 2001, 30). 
During the presidency of Reagan a covert program was implemented, which was to support 
Libyan exiles with overthrowing the Gadhafi regime (O‟Sullivan, 2003, 176). In the spring of 
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1986 the US moved parts of the 6
th
 fleet into the Gulf of Sidra to assert the right of the US to 
navigate these waters. The US hoped at the time that military conflict would weaken Gadhafi. 
After the bombing of the Berlin disco in 1986 the US bombed several targets in Libya 
(Niblock, 2001, 31; Hufbauer et al., 2009, cd). The air raid by the US was not very effective 
except for sending a message. Two American pilots died for a handful of parked Libyan 
planes (Schumacher, 1986, 347). The use of „companion policies‟ did not contribute to the 
success of sanctions, because the outcome was contrary to what the literature expects to be 
successful. 
 
Relative economic size 
The outcome of economic sanctions might be influenced by relative size and the trade links 
between sender and target state. If a sender state imposes minor sanctions towards the target it 
might imply that more costly sanctions will follow if the target state does not comply. A 
larger state would logically be capable of sending greater economic sanctions (Hufbauer et al., 
2009, 62).  
In 80% of the cases the senders GNP was 10 times greater. This ratio shows that the 
sender countries are mostly western actors like the United States, United Kingdom, European 
Union and United Nations. The ratio also shows the relative small size of the target countries. 
Large countries are more likely to use sanctions against smaller economies (Hufbauer et al., 
2009, 89-90). However, because in most of the cases the sender is economically larger than 
the target it is not a very useful factor for the success of economic sanctions. Furthermore the 
relative economic size does not say anything about the trade between sender and target 
(Hufbauer et al., 2009, 167; Drury, 1998, 502). 
At the start of the sanctions in 1978 Libyan GDP was $7.4 billion and the GDP of the 
US was $1427.7 billion unadjusted (Kushnirs, n.d.a.; Kushnirs, n.d.b). Therefore, Libya is one 
of the cases that falls in the 80% in which the sender has a GNP higher by at least a manifold 
of ten (Hufbauer et al., 2009, 62). As expected the „relative economic size‟ did not contribute 
to the success of sanctions. Because the GNP of the US was at least 10 times greater this 
factor proved irrelevant for the success of the sanctions. 
 
Length of sanctions 
The longer sanctions are active, the higher the cost will be for the target state (Dashti-Gibson 
et al., 1997, 609). Therefore some theorize that longer sanctions increase the effectiveness of 
economic sanctions (Dashti-Gibson et al., 1997, 609-610). It can also be argued that shorter 
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sanctions are more effective, because sanctions that have achieved their goal generally have a 
shorter duration. Furthermore if target states do not comply within a certain period of time, 
they most likely will not succumb at all. Longer sanctions can be less effective because states 
can have problems coordinating multilateral sanctions for extended amounts of time (Dashti-
Gibson et al., 1997, 610). If the goal is destabilization, the length of sanctions does not have a 
large impact on the success (Dashti-Gibson et al., 1997, 614). 
The longest duration of sanctions against Libya was 26 years, during this period both 
UN and US sanctions targeted Libya (Hufbauer et al., 2009, 25). The long duration of the 
sanctions by both the US and UN resulted in sanction fatigue. The support for the sanctions 
dropped in the international community and Libya‟s extradition proposal of 1992, in which 
the suspects were extradited to a third country, was reevaluated (O‟Sullivan, 2003, 221-222). 
The literature on the factor „length of sanctions‟ is ambiguous; it is not clear what is needed 
for success. Therefore this factor did not contribute to the success of the sanctions.  
 
Conclusion 
In sum, the four factors „economical health and political stability of the target country‟, 
„regime target state & smart sanctions‟, „type of sanction‟ and „extent of cooperation with the 
sender state‟ contributed to the success of sanctions in the Libyan case. All four factors 
capitalized on the weak Libyan economy and the political instability. Libya wanted to rebuild 
its economy but was hindered because of the sanctions. Libya realized that it could not rebuild 
its economy with sanctions present, and was therefore motivated to agree to the demands of 
the senders. Even though an autocratic state is supposed to be more resilient against sanctions, 
in Libya the sanctions worked. Smart sanctions were especially important because they 
capitalized on the unhealthy Libyan economy. The smart sanctions prevented Libya from 
improving its economy. The US sanctions at first were not very effective at limiting Libya. 
Libya still used terrorism after the imposition of US sanctions, as evidenced by the Lockerbie 
bombing. The UN sanctions were more effective, especially when used to limit Libya‟s 
military and political potential. While less effective at inflicting economic damage, it was not 
necessary for the sanctions to impose huge costs by themselves. The Libyan economy was 
already damaged and could not rebuild without the lifting of sanctions. This also explains why 
the US sanctions were effective after the lifting of the UN sanctions.  
 The factor „costs imposed on target state‟ was a semi-contributor to success. The 
economic damage done cannot be fully attributed to the sanctions. The factor „international 
assistance to the target country‟ was a semi-contributor. While the Soviet Union was a black 
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knight for the first few years, the dissolution of the Soviet Union meant that Libya lost its 
most important support. Also, some companies violated the sanctions. But the amount and 
severity of violations of the sanctions was not big enough to decrease the success of sanctions. 
The „domestic audience sender country‟ put pressure on the US to see the sanctions end 
successful. This only contributed to success after the UN sanctions were lifted.  Lastly, there 
was an asymmetric distribution of „issue salience‟ favoring the sender state. As expected by 
the literature on issue salience the sanctions were successful. The factors in this section all 
contributed to the success of sanctions but did not contribute as much as the „contributing‟ 
factors.  
The factors „warmth of prior relations‟, „commercial relations between target and 
sender state‟, „costs imposed on sender state‟ and „implementation design‟ were not 
applicable in the Libyan case, and therefore did not contribute to success. The factor 
„companion policies‟ was contrary to what the literature stated, and did not contribute to the 
success either. The factor „relative economic size‟ was found to be irrelevant by the literature. 
Finally, the factor „length of sanctions‟ was ambiguous about what is expected for success.  
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